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MINISTRY AND MORTAR: HISTORIC
PRESERVATION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AFTER BAR WICK
ROBERT L. CREWDSON*
On July 2, 1986, the New York Court of Appeals refused to exempt
the Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew in New York City from the
city's landmark preservation ordinance1 on the basis of the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the first amendment.2 Although Church of St. Paul and
St. Andrew v. Barwick' involved a declaratory judgment action and the
court based its decision on ripeness, it reaffirmed the constitutional
standard for religious organizations announced six years earlier in Soci-
ety for Ethical Culture v. Spatt.4 The court in Barwick relied on the
Spatt court's holding that application of the New York City preserva-
tion ordinance to religious property was constitutional unless the law,
* Mr. Crewdson is an attorney with Phillips, Hinchey & Reid in Atlanta, Georgia,
representing developers in all areas of the construction process. B.A. History, Univer-
sity of the South, 1983; M.A. History, College of William and Mary, 1987; J.D. Univer-
sity of Virginia, 1987.
I. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0-207-21.0 (1976 & Supp.
1987). The New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission (Commission) was
established in 1965 to "effect and accomplish the protection, enhancement and perpetu-
ation of such improvements and landscape features and of districts which represent or
reflect elements of the city's cultural, social, economic, political and architectural his-
tory". Id. § 205-1.0(b)(a).
2. U.S. CONST., amend. I. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof"
3. Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67 N.Y.2d 510, 496 N.E.2d 183,
505 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1986).
4. 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980).
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as applied, "physically or financially prevents or seriously interferes
with the charitable purpose."5 Thus, the Spatt court applied what was
essentially a taking standard to religious groups because the court felt
that preservation statutes regulated "secular activities."6
In Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew v. Barwick,7 the court ex-
tended the Spatt holding to require a church to comply with landmark
regulations even if it sought to renovate the worship building for con-
tinuing religious use. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that pres-
ervation statutes do not implicate the first amendment as long as they
merely regulate church buildings and church property development.
The court held that all constitutional claims by religious groups fall
under the less stringent taking standard first applied in charitable, non-
profit cases.8 The Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew, determined to
prevent what it considered unjust infringements on religious freedom,
unsuccessfully appealed to the United States Supreme Court.9
I. BACKGROUND LAND USE CASES AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. State and Federal Zoning Cases
State courts generally ignored the free exercise clause10 in church
zoning cases until the 1970's. In most instances, the constitutional fo-
5. 67 N.Y.2d at 524, n.6. Earlier applications of this rule are found in Society for
Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 9032 (1980);
Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 131, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359
N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974); Matter of Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376,
378, 288 N.Y.2d 314 (1968).
6. 51 N.Y.2d at 551. Spatt involved the construction of a skyscraper for rental to
nonreligious tenants, with the profits to go to the Society.
7. 67 N.Y.2d 510, 496 N.E.2d 183, 505 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1986).
8. The origin of the non-profit standard is found in Snug Harbor, 29 A.D.2d 376,
288 N.Y.2d 314 (1968). Other courts have used similar approaches to preservation
ordinances and religious groups. See First Presbyterian Church of York v. City of
York, 25 Pa. 154, 360 A.2d 257 (1976) (demolition permit could be denied historic
church unless the refusal precluded use of the building for any purpose for which it was
reasonably adapted); Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Scott, 553 S.W.2d 856 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977) (applied same test as York). Both cases borrowed the taking rule from
Maher v. New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 195 (1976).
9. 67 N.Y.2d 510, cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3385 (Dec. 2, 1986). See also Wash.
Post, Sept. 27, 1986 at El.
10. See supra note 2.
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cus was due process. 1 For example, courts generally hold that the
exclusion of churches from an entire community is a denial of substan-
tive due process, principally because churches contribute to the public
welfare. 2 Similarly, many courts hold the exclusion of churches from
residential districts unconstitutional on the same grounds. 3 Recently,
courts have turned to the freedom of religion clauses to strike down
residential exclusions.' 4 Refusing to extend the requirements of those
clauses to preservation cases, court decisions in three states addressing
the issue avoided the first amendment by focusing on the fifth amend-
ment's takings clause.' 5 Missouri and Pennsylvania adopted the taking
standard of Maher v. New Orleans,'6 in which a Louisiana court held
that a preservation ordinance is unconstitutional if it precludes the use
of the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted.17
This approach assumes the absence of first amendment interests.
Several states, however, have established rules of preference for
churches in land use cases. Ironically, the New York Court of Appeals
11. See infra note 15.
12. See Matter of Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488,
154 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1956) and Congregation Committee, North Fort Worth Congrega-
tion, Jehovah's Witnesses v. City Council of Haltom City, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1956). The substantive due process test usually involves determining whether a
statute is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest; courts rarely find statutes
unconstitutional under this test.
13. Community Synagogue, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15; Board
of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Indiana Company of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83,
117 N.E.2d 115 (1954). The minority rule on this issue is found in Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. City of Porterville,
90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 659, 203 P.2d 823, 825, appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949)
("[S]ince the city had power to zone the property herein affected, strictly for single
family dwellings, there was no abuse of power in prohibiting the erection and construc-
tion of church buildings therein.").
14. Church of Christ in Indianapolis v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals of
Marion County, 175 Ind. App. 346, 371 N.E.2d 1331 (1978); Lubavitch Chabad House
of Illinois, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 112 111. App. 3d 223, 445 N.E.2d 343 (1982), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 485 (1983).
15. First Presbyterian Church of York v. City of York, 360 A.2d 257 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1976), and Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Scott, 553 S.W.2d 856 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977). The fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution commands that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST., amend.
V, cl. 4.
16. In Maher, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), an architectural control commission
denied a land owner's request to demolish a building in the French Quarter of New
Orleans in order to construct an apartment building.
17. Id. at 1066.
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has been prominent in creating such preferences since 1968. In West-
chester Reform Temple v. Brown 8 the court refused to enforce a stan-
dard setback provision against a church that desired to expand its
facilities. 9 The court held that "[c]hurches and schools occupy a dif-
ferent status from mere commercial enterprises and when the church
enters the picture, different considerations apply."20 Redefining the
relevant considerations, the court required the state plan to show that
the Temple's proposed expansion would have a "direct and immediate
adverse effect" upon the health, safety, or welfare of the community.2'
The court further stated that the constitutional prohibition against the
free exercise of religion outweighed the problems of increased traffic
and declining property values.22 The constitutionally protected status
of religious structures severely curtails the permissible extent of police
power regulation.23 This heightened protection allows churches and
communities to work out problem areas, while deferring to the church
in the case of an irreconcilable conflict.24
Given the result in Spatt and Barwick, it is interesting to note that
during the eighteen year period following its formulation, the West-
chester Reform Temple standard survived many challenges. The court
in Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of the North Shore v. Incorpo-
rated Village of Roslyn Harbor2" used the Westchester doctrine to
strike down a setback provision because it lacked a substantial require-
ment to mitigate public concerns when religious groups were in-
volved.26 In a subsequent case, the court employed the "direct and
18. 22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1968).
19. Id. The setback is the distance from the front, side, and back lot lines to the
building.
20. Id. at 493, 239 N.E.2d at 894, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 301, (quoting Matter of Diocese
of Rochester v. Planning Board, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 523, 136 N.E.2d 827, 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d
849, 859 [1956]).
21. Id. at 494, 239 N.E.2d at 895, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 302. Normally the test in such
cases is whether the state can show that its regulation is reasonably related to the gen-
eral welfare.
22. Id. at 496, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 497, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 304. The court held protection
of the first amendment right of religious freedom outweighed community health, safety
and welfare concerns. Id.
25. 38 N.Y.2d 283, 342 N.E.2d 534, 539 (1975).
26. Id. The dissent warned that the court was setting a precedent for churches
which might overcome all zoning regulations. 38 N.Y.2d at 292, 342 N.E.2d at 541
(Jones, J., dissenting).
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immediate adverse effect" test to find denial of a special use permit
unconstitutional, even where a hostile public reaction to the congrega-
tion was probable.27 In a case decided after Spatt, the court restated
the municipality's affirmative obligation to adopt less restrictive alter-
natives to avoid completely barring a religious institution from locating
or expanding its facilities in a residential neighborhood.28
New York courts continue to address the question of which acces-
sory uses of a religious organization are entitled to this additional pro-
tection. Many uses, for instance, relate only tangentially to the
primary religious activity, such as a church softball field or gymna-
sium. The most recent case dealing with this problem, Application of
Covenant Community Church Inc.,29 upheld a religious group's judi-
cially recognized right to utilize its facilities and premises for non-reli-
gious activities that support and strengthen its religious practice.3 0
The conflict concerned construction of a daycare and recreational facil-
ity adjacent to the church building. Citing Matter of Community Syna-
gogue v. Bates,31 the court noted that religious uses include more than
prayer and sacrifice and that social activity plays a key role in strength-
ening the church and its ties to the community.32 Bright Horizon
House Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals33 tempered this principle some-
what, however, in holding that a residential care facility was a secular
use even though it included prayer and contemplation as part of its
healing program.3 4
The distinction between religious and secular uses has troubled other
state courts. One Illinois court found that residential property used for
fellowship classes constitutes a religious use.35 An Idaho court ruled
that a lighted softball complex built by a church was an accessory
church use under the zoning ordinance in question. 6 The distinction
27. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification v. Rosenfeld, 181 A.D.2d 190, 458 N.Y.S.2d
920, 927 (App. Div. 1983).
28. North Shore Hebrew Academy v. Wegman, 105 A.D.2d 702,481 N.Y.S.2d 142,
146 (App. Div. 1984).
29. 444 N.Y.S.2d 415, 111 Misc. 2d 537 (App. Div. 1981).
30. Id.
31 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1956).
32. Covenant Community Church, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 422, 111 Misc. at 547.
33. 469 N.Y.S.2d 851, 121 Misc. 2d 703 (1983).
34. Id.
35. Twin City Bible Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 50 Ill. App. 3d 924, 365
N.E.2d 1381 (1977).
36. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v.
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between religious and secular uses is both unnecessary and dangerous,
particularly because it demands inquiry into the purposes and goals of
the religious organization. 37
Other states have followed New York's example of instituting special
tests for religious groups in land use cases. Colorado created a substan-
tial state interest test in Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Author-
ity.38 In a proceeding to condemn the church building housing the
Pillar of Fire organization, the court required the state to "show a sub-
stantial interest without a reasonable alternate means of accomplish-
ment." 39 Holding that religious faith and tradition can render certain
structure and land sites worthy of first amendment protection, the Col-
orado Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. 40
The same court later applied the substantial interest test to require a
church to improve certain public streets in conjunction with the devel-
opment of its property.41
Texas and Washington have also adopted stricter standards. In a
residential exclusion case, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals promul-
gated a balancing test within the context of due process analysis. 42 The
Ashton, 92 Idaho 571, 448 P.2d 185 (1968). See also Diakonian Soc'y v. City of Chi-
cago Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 63 Ill. App. 3d 823, 380 N.E.2d 843 (1978) (residence used
by group of religious professionals must be considered appropriate monastery use);
Fountain Gate Ministries, Inc. v. City of Piano, 654 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)
(religious organization's operation of a college does not constitute religious use for first
amendment protection).
37. See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text. Courts feel compelled to use this
distinction because of the Supreme Court's decision in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
601 (1960). In that case, the Court upheld Sunday closing laws even though they bur-
dened Saturday worshippers because the regulation applied merely to secular activities,
i.e., the sale of goods. The principle worked well in that case, since the plaintiffs did not
claim that their selling of goods was a religious activity. Such is not the case in land use
matters, which present much harder questions as to what activity is "religious."
38. 181 Colo. 411, 509 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1973).
39. Id.
40. 509 P.2d at 1254. The condemnation was eventually upheld in Denver Urban
Renewal Auth. v. Pillar of Fire, 191 Colo. 238, 552 P.2d 23 (1976). The court balanced
the interests of the Renewal Authority for urban renewal in downtown Denver against
the church's interest in maintaining its building. The church used its building primarily
as a rooming house since the denomination had moved its primary worship place to
another part of Denver. The court found that the Renewal Authority's interests out-
weighed those of the church. Id.
41. Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood, 626 P.2d 668
(Colo. 1981).
42. Congregation Committee, North Fort Worth Congregation, Jehovah's Wit-
nesses v. City Council of Haltom, 287 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956).
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court held that property values and traffic problems lack a substantial
relation to the safety, morals and general welfare of the community.43
Applying its balancing test, the court reasoned that the right of free-
dom of worship outweighs any benefit the community would realize
from maintaining property values and avoiding traffic problems.
44
The Washington Supreme Court recently held that even indirect
burdens on churches from zoning regulations required courts to bal-
ance the interest of the parties and determine which interest must
yield.45 The case concerned the application of a municipal building
code to a church school. The court held that municipalities should be
flexible in balancing the interests of worshipers and the legislature's
concerns as expressed in the building code.46 Judge Dolliver in dissent
sharply criticized the majority for virtually adopting a compelling state
interest test when religious beliefs and principles were not involved.47
A few other states have altered their constitutional standards in zoning
cases involving religious groups. In New Jersey, for example, one
court enhanced its procedural due process analysis when the state at-
tempted to apply zoning regulations to religious properties.4"
Many state and federal courts, however, persist in their efforts to
reject claims of special preference for religious groups. Several states
apply a routine reasonableness test to all zoning regulations in church
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362
(1982). A strong message was sent to municipalities that when
confronted with rights protected by the [flirst [a]mendment, it should not be un-
compromising and rigid. Rather, it should approach the problem with flexibility.
There should be some play in the joints of both the zoning ordinance and the build-
ing code. An effort to accommodate the religious freedom of the appellants while
at the same time giving effect to the legitimate concerns of the city as expressed in
its building code and zoning ordinance would seem to be in order.
Id. at 1363.
46. 639 P.2d at 1363.
47. 639 P.2d at 1368 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). The standard of a "necessary rela-
tionship to a compelling state interest" is required when free exercise rights are
burdened.
48. State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586, 498 A.2d 1217 (1985) (temporary use of a min-
ister's home for weekly services involved constitutionally protected interests.) See also
Milharcic v. Metro, Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 489 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 1966) (need
or benefit of the state police power must outweigh the restriction on the rights of free-
dom of worship); Rapid City v. Kohler, 334 N.W.2d 510, 512 (S.D. 1983) (religious
uses are favored for their unique contribution to the public welfare and because of con-
stitutional guarantees).
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cases.4 9 Two recent federal circuit cases hampered efforts of religious
groups to obtain special protection. In Lakewood, Ohio, Congregation
of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood,5" the Sixth Circuit ex-
amined an ordinance limiting churches to ten percent of the entire city
land area.5" Declaring the construction of a church to be a secular
activity, the court found that the ordinance failed to burden first
amendment interests.52
Also ruling against a religious group seeking special protection, in
Grosz v. City of Miami Beach " the Eleventh Circuit upheld an injunc-
tion against a Jewish sect which used a member's garage for religious
worship in a residential zone that excluded churches.5 4 Finding that
there were no protected first amendment interests, the court noted that
the sect had alternative locations to worship, and that the integrity of
the city's planning scheme controlled. The court also held that con-
venience, economics, and aesthetics were not constitutionally cogniza-
49. St. John's Roman Catholic Church v. Darien, 149 Conn. 712, 184 A.2d 42
(1962) (zoning regulations are applied to church schools in the same manner as private
schools). See also Faith Assembly of God v. State Bldg. Code Comm., 416 N.E.2d 228
(Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (church schools are not entitled to special protection from zoning
regulations); Wilmington Housing Auth. v. Greater St. John Baptist Church, 291 A.2d
282 (Del. 1972) (churches get no special exemption from condemnation proceedings
based on free exercise guarantees).
50. 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
51. Id. The Jehovah Witness group members claimed the zoning ordinance in-
fringed on their first, fourth and fourteenth amendment rights and sought damages pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983.
52. Id. at 307. The court held the ordinance was a legitimate exercise of the city's
police power because it merely limited, instead of completely prohibiting, the building
of church facilities in the city. Noting that the zoning ordinance reserved ten percent
(10%) of the city land for religious use, the court concluded that choice of location for a
new facility was a secular rather than a religious decision and was therefore not consti-
tutionally protected. Id. at 306-07.
53. 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983).
54. Id. Petitioners in the case had not applied for a zoning change. Rather, they
applied for a building permit to have their garage remodeled for use as a "playroom."
When petitioners received the building permit, the city informed them that they could
not use the garage for religious purposes. Id. at 730-32. Notwithstanding this restric-
tion, petitioners converted the garage into a small synagogue, a shul. The city issued a
notice of violation because petitioners conducted religious services twice a day in the
garage, contrary to the zoning ordinance. After weighing the free exercise rights of
petitioners against the city's interest in restrictive zoning, the court ruled in favor of the
city. Id. at 739-41.
55. Id. at 739.
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ble burdens on religion.5
6
Perhaps more damaging to the efforts of religious groups in ob-
taining special protection was a recent federal case in New York, where
the district court held that the free exercise guarantee only covered
beliefs, not religious activities.57 The court drew on the historic dis-
tinction in Cantwell v. Connecticut58 that the first amendment fully
protected individuals' beliefs, but allowed states to regulate religious
conduct as necessary. Moreover, the district court held that judges
could inquire into the bona fides of religious belief if religious activity
were at issue.59
These state and federal decisions greatly underestimate the first
amendment interests involved in such cases. They reinforce the notion
that the distinction between secular use and religious use ought to be
dispositive. ° Further, the courts used the distinction between belief
and practice to eliminate all but the most fundamental elements of
religion.
B. Federal Land Management Cases
Many federal land use problems occur when federal agencies at-
tempt to manage governmental land that Indian tribes hold sacred. In
Badoni v. Higginson 6 the Tenth Circuit examined the construction of
a reservoir on federal property that Indians used for religious prac-
tices.62 The court held that, although the flooding of religious shrines
implicated free exercise interests, the state showed a compelling need to
build the reservoir.63
56. Id.
57. Holy Spirit Ass'n v. Rosenfeld, 480 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See supra
note 27 for a subsequent state decision concerning the same dispute.
58. 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). The Supreme Court distinguished between religious
beliefs and religious activity and stated that conduct was subject to "reasonable" regula-
tions, clarifying that there was no absolute protection.
59. 480 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (citing Stevens v. Burger, 428 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
60. See also Comment, Zoning Ordinances Affecting Churches: A Proposal for Ex-
panded Free Exercise Protection, 132 PA. L. REV. 1131 (June 1984) [hereinater Com-
ment] (advocating a broader free exercise analysis to protect religiously motivated
activity to a time, place and manner of speech restriction standard in order to protect
religious activity as well as to allow courts sufficient flexibility to uphold legitimate
governmental action).
61. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 177-78.
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In contrast, although also ruling in favor of the government in a
reservoir case, the court in Seqouyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,6 4
based its decision on the absence of a protected first amendment inter-
est.65 The Indian plaintiffs failed to establish that the property was
indispensable to the practice of their faith. 66 Since the Indians had a
compelling interest in practicing their religion,67 this case created what
appears to be an unnecessarily high standard.
Two later cases adopted the Seqouyah standard. Crow v. Gullet,68
for example, held that the government action must affect a practice of
"indispensable centrality" to the religious faith for the action to violate
the first amendment. A second case, Wilson v. Block,69 approved a
federal expansion of a ski facility on land sacred to the Indians, holding
that such encroachment did not affect a belief or practice "rooted in
religion" and did not "penalize faith."7° These courts emphasized the
distinction between belief and action, holding that the location of, and
burden upon, religious practice was irrelevant under the first amend-
ment. These decisions suggest that even if the government action af-
fects belief, it must burden "indispensable" or "central" beliefs. With
minor exceptions,71 the federal case law in this area severely restricts
protection of religious activity to those activities absolutely essential to
survival of the religion. Extension of these limited views of the Free
Exercise Clause to cases dealing with preservation laws would hinder
the growing preference for churches in land use cases.
64. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1164.
67. Inupiat Community v. U.S., 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982), another Indian
case, emphasized the compelling interest of the government in managing offshore
properties in compliance with treaty obligations.
68. 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982).
69. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
70. Id. at 740.
71. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581 (9th
Cir. 1985) (government logging interests were not compelling and such actions affected
things indispensable to Indian religion); United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247
(D.S.D. 1985) (government interest failed to justify Forest Service restrictions on the
use of federal park land which burdened religion).
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II. THE BARWICK CASE
A. The Administrative Process
In 1965 New York City created a comprehensive scheme to protect
and enhance the "city's cultural, social, economic, political and archi-
tectural history."7 2 The Landmarks Commission, a citizen body of ar-
chitects, historians, business people and other community
representatives, is the administrative agency that enforced the ordi-
nance. 3 The designation of landmark status for a structure under this
statute can be a lengthy process. After a person alerts the Commission
to a potential landmark eligible for protection from alteration or demo-
lition, the Commission investigates the merit of the particular structure
or property. After notifying the owners, certain public officials and the
local Community Board, the Commission schedules the nomination for
a public hearing.74 In designating a landmark, the Commission only
considers historical, architectural, and aesthetic factors, ignoring eco-
nomic hardship to the owner.7" Following the hearing, the Commis-
sion can designate the structure a landmark, effective immediately.
7 6
The Commission then files a copy of the designation with the City
Board of Estimate, which can approve, disapprove, or modify the
Commission's action within sixty days.7 7 If the City Board of Estimate
approves the landmark status, the designation becomes final.
After the Commission designates a building a landmark, its owner
must comply with maintenance and repair provisions. The New York
scheme subjects the owner to criminal penalties for failure to comply
with these provisions. In addition, the owner may not alter, recon-
struct, or demolish the structure without consent of the Commission. 8
The owner who wishes to alter or demolish a designated landmark has
two options. First, the owner may request a "Certificate of Appropri-
ateness" for the desired project, which ensures that the proposed action
72. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0-207-21.0 (1976). See
supra note 1. A good review of the statute can be found in Note, First Amendment
Challenges to Landmark Preservation Statutes, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115, 119 (1982).
73. See generally NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0-207-21.0.
74. Id. These boards serve as local nominating and informational sources.
75. See generally COMMITrEE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERFAITH COMMISSION TO STUDY THE LANDMARK-
ING OF RELIGIOUS PROPERTY 28 (1982) [hereinafter Interfaith Report].
76. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-2.0(b), (e).
77. Id. at § 207-2.0(g)(1).
78. Id. at § 207-16.0.
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will not have a detrimental effect on the protected features.79 "Certifi-
cates of No Effect" or "Permits for Minor Work" are available when
protected features are not involved.8"
Second, the owner can seek a Certificate of Appropriateness based
on economic hardship. A nonprofit owner must meet three conditions:
1) there must be a contract to sell the property or lease it for twenty
years or more; 2) without the proposed action, the commercial prop-
erty is unable to earn a reasonable return; and 3) without the proposed
action, the building is unsuitable for the owner's purpose, or the pur-
pose for which the owner originally used it.81 If the owner meets the
economic hardship test, the Commission will seek a purchaser or ten-
ant willing to maintain the landmark, or recommend that the city
purchase the building or merely its facade.82 If the Commission fails to
choose either of these options, the owners may proceed as they wish.
The potential for first amendment problems arises for two reasons.
First, the appropriateness procedure requires evaluation of architecture
that reflects religious doctrine.8 3 Second, the hardship procedure,
which determines whether the property is still suitable for the owner's
purpose, entails delicate evaluation of religious ministries and
activities.84
B. Development of the New York Test for Landmark Legislation in
Religious Property Cases
The New York City landmark law received its first constitutional
test in Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt.85 A charitable organization that
provided residential facilities for retired seamen challenged the applica-
tion of the ordinance to its 19th Century Greek Revival buildings.86
Conceding that the restrictions embodied in the statute were generally
79. Interfaith Report, supra note 75, at 31.
80. Id.
81. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE, § 207-8.0(a)(2).
82. Id. at § 207-8.0(i)(4)(a).
83. See infra notes 152 & 153 and accompanying text.
84. The hardship procedure now seems to cover religious properties regardless of
whether the sale-lease requirement has been met. Although the Church of St. Paul and
St. Andrew had not leased away its worship building, the court of appeals required it to
undergo the Commission hardship procedures.
85. Matter of Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.2d
314 (1968).
86. Id. at 315. The organization desired to destroy the buildings and construct
modem accommodations.
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within the police power, the Appellate Division warned that under cer-
tain circumstances the law could amount to a taking.87 The court's
test in Snug Harbor for a taking was whether "maintenance of the
landmark either physically or financially prevents or seriously inter-
feres with carrying out the charitable purpose."88 The court noted that
the answer depended on whether conversion to a useful purpose would
entail excessive cost and whether maintenance of the historic structure
would involve serious expenditures "in light of the purposes and re-
sources of the petitioner." 89
In 1974, the Lutheran Church case revived debate over the constitu-
tionality of the landmarks statute by challenging application of the law
on first amendment grounds." The Church owned a former residence
of J. P. Morgan which had become totally inadequate for the organiza-
tion's corporate and religious purposes. The Church sought to demol-
ish the house and erect a 19-story building in its place.91 With aprima
facie showing that the Church would have to abandon the property if
the statute denied its rebuilding plans, the court declared the landmark
designation to be a taking. 92 In applying the Snug Harbor standard,
the court ignored the free exercise claims and instead treated the reli-
gious organization as a charitable entity for purposes of constitutional
adjudication.
Many religious groups hoped, however, that Lutheran Church left
unresolved the free exercise claims. In 1980, the Society for Ethical
Culture, a religious and charitable organization, sought injunctive re-
lief from the designation of its meeting house as an historical
landmark. 93 Although successful in the trial court,9 4 the Appellate Di-
vision rejected the Society's taking and first amendment claims, hold-
ing the Society was unable to use free exercise rights to enhance
development of religious property. The principal issue in the case was
87. Id. at 316.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Lutheran Church in America v. New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305,
359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
91. 35 N.Y.2d at 133, 316 N.E.2d at 313, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 18 (Jansen, J.,
dissenting).
92. 35 N.Y.2d at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 316, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
93. Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434
N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980).
94. 68 A.D.2d 112, 416 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1979).
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whether the Society could erect an office tower to rent to non-religious
tenants, thereby receiving a financial boost for the group's religious ac-
tivities. The Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate court's decision,
holding that feasible alternatives existed for protecting the historic
facade and accommodating additional development. As a result of
these alternatives, the designation failed to seriously interfere with the
organization's charitable use.95 Moreover, since the restriction merely
affected development prospects, rather than buildings currently used
for religious purposes, no free exercise interests existed.96 The court
reasoned that religious organizations lack immunity from government
regulation when they act in "purely secular matters.",97
In this way, the Court distinguished Westchester,98 which involved
the location of and right to build a worship facility. In that case, the
court found a special constitutional interest in religious structures
which required heightened scrutiny of zoning regulations. In Spatt 99
the Court drew a distinction based on the fact that the regulations only
restricted development of non-religious facilities. Thus, if a group is
building a church it is entitled to extra protection; if it is demolishing a
portion of its facilities for construction of "secular" buildings, it re-
ceives no special protection. By failing to apply special rules to a
church which desired to renovate its own worship facility,"°° the Bar-
wick court eliminated this distinction.
Controversy over application of the landmarks ordinance to reli-
gious property literally erupted in the 1980's. In September, 1980, the
Committee of Religious Leaders of the City of New York appointed an
Interfaith Commission to study the landmark designation of religious
buildings.1"' The Commission issued a detailed report in January,
1982, specifying the various ways that the ordinance interfered with
religious freedom. The Commission found that landmark designation
"drains off valuable resources which otherwise would be redeployed for
more effective ministry."1 12 The Commission objected to the govern-
ment's indirect appropriation of religious contributions for architec-
95. 51 N.Y.2d at 455, 415 N.E.2d at 926, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
96. 51 N.Y.2d at 456, 415 N.E.2d at 926, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
97. Id.
98. 22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297.
99. 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 443 N.Y.S.2d 932.
100. 67 N.Y.2d 510, 496 N.E.2d 183, 505 N.Y.S.2d 24.
101. 1 PRESERVATION L. REP. 1039 (1982).
102. Interfaith Report, supra note 75 at 4.
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tural preservation, arguing that it clearly violated free exercise
guarantees.° 3 The report further noted that the landmark procedures
were susceptible to abuse and arbitrary manipulation, thereby placing
tremendous burdens on congregations, even where hardship relief was
unavailable." Finally, the Commission proposed that every religious
group be given a veto over landmark designation of its property. 0 5
One of the controversies the Commission discussed in the Interfaith
Report was the attempt of St. Bartholomew's Church on Park Avenue
to erect an office tower on its property and demolish its landmarked
parish house. Before the congregation was able to consider the devel-
opment proposal, several City councilmen held a press conference to
denounce the plan.'0 6 In May, 1982, the court of appeals settled an
exhaustive battle over church bylaws by upholding a vote in favor of
selling or leasing a portion of the church property to a developer.I0 7
Members of the congregation opposed to the development plan went to
court again in January, 1986. In an effort to prevent further expendi-
ture of church funds for the proposals without a majority vote of the
congregation, these congregation members sought a preliminary in-
junction against the vestry.' 8 Although successful in obtaining the in-
junction, the group must now reconsider its role in light of the lawsuit
St. Bartholomew's Church recently filed against the Landmarks
Commission."°
Originally, the vestry proposed a fifty-nine story office tower to be
constructed above its community house and next to the church." o The
Church alleged that the projected $9.5 million in revenue in the first
ten years was imperative for the solvency of the congregation." ' As in
103. Id. at 6.
104. Id. at 10-11.
105. Id. at 25. In 1983, proponents of religious freedom introduced a law designed
to exempt religious properties from preservation statutes, but the New York legislature
rejected their proposal.
106. Id. at 19.
107. Rector, Church Wardens and Vestrymen of St. Bartholomew's Church v.
Comm. to Preserve St. Bartholomew's Church, 56 N.Y.2d 71, 436 N.E.2d 489, 451
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1982). See also I PRESERV. L. REP. 1039 (1982).
108. Morris v. Scribner, Slip Op. No. 26992 (App. Div. N.Y. 1986).
109. Id. The church filed suit in federal district court against the Commission in
April and the case has not gone to trial as of this writing. N.Y. Times, April 9, 1986, II,
at 3, col. 4.
110. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1981, at Al, col. 4.
111. Id. The developer was willing to spend as much as thirty percent (30%) more
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the Spatt case, rental space in the new building would be primarily for
non-religious tenants. The Commission rejected the Church's plan.
Subsequently, the church proposed a scaled-down version of the devel-
opment, providing for a forty-seven story brick and limestone struc-
ture. 1 2 The Commission also rejected the modified proposal, and the
Church applied for hardship certification under the law. After a bitter
battle, the Landmarks Commission ultimately rejected the hardship
claim of the congregation."1 3
C. The Barwick Decision
In 1982, the United Methodist Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew
joined the chorus of religious opposition to the landmark statute. In an
effort to discontinue the landmark designation of its building, the
church filed suit for injunctive relief against the Commission.14 The
church also sought $30 million in damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that the extreme cost of compliance with the preserva-
tion law amounted to a violation of its first amendment rights to free
exercise of religion." 5 The plaintiff also contended that the repair and
maintenance provisions of the statute seriously impaired the plaintiff's
ability to carry out its charitable purpose.' 6 The Commission argued
that such claims were premature because the church failed to under-
take the hardship procedure outlined in the statute, and because the
Commission submitted affidavits showing it had no current intention of
enforcing the repair provisions." 7 The trial court concluded that the
matter was not ripe for judicial review and that the church's lack of
funds, not the landmark designation, caused the church's financial cri-
sis. The Appellate Division affirmed and the church appealed to the
than normal on the project because of the historic structure. Note, Model Free Exercise
Challenges For Religious Landmarks, 34 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 144, 163 n. 116 (1983)
[hereinafter Note].
112. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1985, II, at 1, col. 5.
113. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1986, II, at 3, col. 1. Although the congregation had
substantial assets, needed repairs to the church were estimated at $2 million.
114. Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67 N.Y.2d 510, 496 N.E.2d
183, 505 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1986).
115. 2 PRESERV. L. REP. 1061 (1983).
116. 67 N.Y.2d at 527, 496 N.E.2d at 194, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 35 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
117. Id. See NEw YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-8.0. Also, no renova-
tion plans had been submitted to the Commission.
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New York Court of Appeals.' l8
The church's affidavits disclosed an appalling financial situation.
The sanctuary, built in 1897, was designed to seat 1,400 worshippers.
Although initially filled to capacity, the Sunday worship service gradu-
ally dwindled to 100 participants in the 1980's." 9 Holding services in
the church became financially prohibitive. The heating expenses,
which totalled only $11,400 in 1974, exceeded $40,000 in 1986.120 In
1982 the cost of heating, insurance, and emergency repairs consumed
70% of all pledges, donations, and loans by members of the congrega-
tion for that year.' 2' The parish house facilities were inadequate for
many of the religious programs and activities. In addition, the church
closed the balcony as unsafe and described the electrical and plumbing
fixtures as "decrepit."'' 22 Falling masonry had become a hazard to
pedestrians, sections of the walls rotted due to roof leakage, and it was
estimated that more than $350,000 was necessary to complete external
repairs.23 The financial condition of the church was such that counsel
for the Commission "tacitly conceded that the Church's claims of fi-
nancial hardship appear well-founded."' 124
The majority opinion of the New York Court of Appeals, written by
Judge Hancock, affirmed the Appellate Division, and concluded that
the Commission had to consider the Church's renovation plans and its
hardship status before the court could review the Church's claims. 125
The court noted that the Church claimed that the Commission's repair
and maintenance provisions caused the Church immediate injury, and
that the Commission's process itself interfered with the free exercise of
118. 110 A.D.2d 1095 (1985) (order and judgment affirmed without opinion).
119. 67 N.Y.2d at 528, 496 N.E.2d at 194, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 35 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
120. Id. Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1986, at El, col. 3.




124. Id. In 1980, the church completed a proposed renovation plan that would
retain the exterior walls fronting West End and 86th, but destroy the square tower at
the north end of the front facade and replace the remainder of the building with a
smaller sanctuary. Additionally, the church would erect an apartment building on the
rear portion of the property to provide additional revenue. The parish abandoned this
plan in 1981 when the church became a landmark. 67 N.Y.2d at 529, 496 N.E.2d at
195, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 36 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
125. 67 N.Y.2d at 514, 496 N.E.2d at 185-86, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
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religion. 126 Applying the ripeness inquiry of Abbott Labs, 27 Judge
Hancock found that "finality" was lacking because the application of
the law to the plaintiff was uncertain and incomplete.128 Therefore, the
court refused to address the merits of the case directly. 129
The majority distinguished its prior zoning decisions, in which it ap-
plied special rules to religious organizations, 3 by noting that any ef-
fect on this church's religious activities would be contingent on future
developments resulting from the review process.' Implicit in this
holding is the notion that the statute can constitutionally be applied to
religious groups without first amendment problems. Accordingly, the
court refused to lower the standards of ripeness in order to hear the
church's first amendment claims. 13 2 More importantly, the court reaf-
firmed the constitutionality test in Spatt, which stated that a religious
group could escape a preservation ordinance if it showed that the stat-
ute materially interfered with the performance of its charitable
purpose.
133
Judge Meyer filed an extensive dissent, in which Judges Simons and
Alexander concurred. The dissent posed the issue as one of a direct
conflict between the police power interest in preservation, on the one
hand, and free exercise rights under the first amendment, on the other.
In such conflicts religious liberty should prevail. In ruling against the
church, the majority had "subordinated religious freedom to a secular
126. 67 N.Y.2d at 517, n.3, 496 N.E.2d at 187, n.3, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 28, n.3. See
supra Section IIA of this article for an explanation of the Commission's process (judi-
cial review allowed after agency action is final and compliance with the regulation re-
quires a substantial change in party's behavior).
127. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). The facial validity of
the law was, in fact, challenged by the Church.
128. 67 N.Y.2d at 522, 496 N.E.2d at 190, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
129. Id.
130. 67 N.Y.2d at 516, 467 N.E.2d at 187, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 28. The court distin-
guished this case from Spat and Snug Harbor in three ways. First, the churches in
those cases wished to demolish old buildings, whereas in this case the petitioners wanted
to renovate an existing structure. Furthermore, the petitioners did not challenge the
Commission's authority to declare the church a landmark. Finally, the Commission
had not yet had the opportunity to act on an application for appropriateness, therefore
the issue was not ripe for judicial determination.
131. See supra notes 13-21.
132. 67 N.Y.2d at 524-25, 496 N.E.2d at 192-93, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 33-34. As noted
later in this article, the process itself causes both Establishment Clause and Free Exer-
cise Clause problems. See infra Section IIIA.
133. Id. Since the court held, however, that the constitutionality of the statute was
not ripe for judicial determination, this test was merely dicta.
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purpose of lesser importance."' 134 The dissent found a constitutional
violation stemming from the Commission's process, not from the ex-
penditure of church funds for architectural preservation. 135 Conse-
quently, the dissent found that the Snug Harbor constitutionality test
was still the appropriate standard of review for religious organizations
with respect to financial burdens.
136
Judge Meyer sharply criticized the majority for insisting that the
church undertake the Commission's hardship procedure. Arguing that
the issue belongs in the courts, Judge Meyer stated that the Commis-
sion lacked statutory authority to deal with the hardship issue with
respect to religious and charitable organizations.13 7 By forcing the
church to use the appropriateness procedures, the majority encouraged
the Commission to negotiate hardship under the guise of architectural
appropriateness. Neither the hardship procedure nor the appropriate-
ness procedure was a statutorily authorized function of the Commis-
sion, and both interfered with freedom of religion. 138 Meyer pointed
out that the case was similar to Lutheran Church, where the court
granted relief prior to exhaustion of the administrative remedies. 139
The identical issue was presented here, where St. Paul's showed a
prima facie case of hardship."4 Thus, no factual question remained
134. 67 N.Y.2d at 526, 496 N.E.2d at 193, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 34 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
135. 67 N.Y.2d at 530, 496 N.E.2d at 196, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 37 (Meyer, J., dissent-
ing). See supra Section 11A of this article for an explanation of the Commission's
process.
136. Id. This test provides that retention of landmark designation depends on the
extent of interference with a building's use, as well as the cost of maintaining a building
of landmark quality, considered in light of the organization's resources.
137. 67 N.Y.2d at 533, 496 N.E.2d at 198, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 39 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
138. Id. The dissent noted that only courts could grant hardship exemptions, under
the Spatt standard, when the religious group was continuing its use after renovation,
and not signing a contract of sale or lease. Id.
139. Id. See Lutheran Church, 35 N.Y.2d at 128, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d
at 14.
140. 67 N.Y.2d at 537, 496 N.E.2d at 200, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 41 (Meyer, J., dissent-
ing). A first amendment violation was clearly made out where
in order to achieve the financial basis necessary for it to carry out its religious and
charitable work it must submit not just to the preservation of the 86th Street and
West End Avenue exterior walls that have been landmarked, but also to the Com-
mission's intermeddling in its overall rebuilding plan or establish to the satisfaction
of the Commission, in the guise of the Commission providing it with a reasonable
alternative, that its financial situation is such that it should be permitted to par-
tially demolish and rebuild the existing structure.
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and the case was ripe for judicial review. In this context, it was offen-
sive to the congregation's first amendment rights to give the power it
exercised in Lutheran Church to the Commission to approve or disap-
prove church plans to its satisfaction. 141
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AFTER BAR WICK
Clearly, the New York Court of Appeals is intent on avoiding the
difficult issues posed by preservation and the Free Exercise Clause. In
Spatt, the secular use distinction was an easy way to dismiss the
church's fundamental first amendment claims.1 41 Similarly, in Bar-
wick the court used ripeness as a convenient ground for ignoring the
particular burdens of the Commission process. The prevalence of first
amendment concerns in these preservation cases mandates that courts
conduct a thorough evaluation of the constitutional issues they have
tactfully avoided.
A. The First Amendment Burden
Traditionally, courts have refused to find a constitutionally cogniza-
ble "burden" on religious freedom unless the challenged state action
interfered with activities "integrally related" to fundamental religious
beliefs or principles.' 43 Several Supreme Court cases involved factual
circumstances assumed to implicate fundamental religious beliefs, and
thus the Court did not address areas where the connection was more
tenuous or less traditional.1" Lower courts took the Supreme Court
Id.
141. 67 N.Y.2d at 535, 496 N.E.2d at 199, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 40 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
142. The New York Court of Appeals adopted this distinction in Spatt to justify
avoidance of first amendment issues. 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d
932.
143. Note, Applying Historic Preservation Ordinances to Church Property, 63 N.C.L.
REv. 404, 409 (Jan. 1985) [hereinafter Historic Preservation Ordinances]. The author
states that courts generally determine whether church property is used for religious or
secular purposes. If the use is not purely secular, the court then determines whether
compliance with the zoning or preservation regulation unduly burdens the congrega-
tion's first amendment right to free exercise of religion. Finally, the court examines the
state's purposes and decides whether the state can achieve those purposes in a less re-
strictive manner. The author nonetheless concludes that a total exemption of churches
from landmark preservation statutes would be unconstitutional in that government
must remain neutral towards religious organizations. Id.
144. But see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Court held unconstitutional a
regulation which denied unemployment benefits because the religious employee could
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approach as a signal to apply the first amendment only in cases where
there was a direct burden on the ability to worship or believe.145 Ex-
emplifying this approach, federal cases concerning Indian religious
practices applied the first amendment only to state action that bur-
dened "an indispensable belief" or practice. 146  Counsel for the
Landmarks Commission in the Barwick case argued that courts should
treat religious activity in the same manner as commercial activity when
a religious organization challenges preservation ordinances.147 This
author advocates greater first amendment protection for churches be-
cause landmark regulations often impose significant burdens on both
religious belief and on its exercise.
1. Architectural Infringement
One commentator remarked that "the aesthetic characteristics of a
church structure and its surroundings influence the activities held
within it."'1 48  Moreover, the "spiritual and aesthetic experience that
religious ritual offers contributes to the inner life of many individu-
als."' 49 Intimately bound up in any religious structure are religious
values, symbols, and forms of expression. 5' Architectural historian
Paul Goldberger described the bond between religious structure and
spirit by stating that architecture "reflects our values at least as much
as it creates them." 5 ' This is particularly true in the case of church
not work on her Sabbath); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school
attendance could not be applied to Amish children since the public schools would ex-
pose such children to things incompatible with their faith). Both cases involved indi-
rect, less traditional burdens since they regulated "secular" activities, i.e.,
unemployment benefits and school attendance. This seems to suggest that the Court's
reasoning in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 601 (1960) was broader than intended.
145. See Lakewood, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lake-
wood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1982), where the court found that zoning ordinances
could not possibly implicate first amendment guarantees.
146. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
147. Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1986, at E20, col. 1.
148. Comment, supra note 60, at 1151-52. The author argues that since an individ-
ual's decision to join a church, as well as the congregation's decision on the location and
the aesthetic features of the church, are communicative forms of expression, free speech
principles should also apply to free exercise cases.
149. Id.
150. One need not refer to the striking characteristics of the 17th Century Anabap-
tist meeting house, with its whitewashed square form, to recognize the underlying reli-
gious value and symbolism of a worship facility's architecture.
151. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1985, II, at 33, col. 3.
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buildings because their symbolic, religious architecture has served to
distinguish entire architectural periods throughout civilized history.
Clearly, many elements of architectural form, including spatial ar-
rangements, building materials and paint color play important roles in
both religious ritual and religious expression. These elements are also
key factors in the Landmarks Commission's determination of the "ap-
propriateness" of alterations or new construction. 1 2
Although most ordinances only affect exterior features, several cities
have applied preservation laws to the interiors of churches.'- 3 Interior
regulation affects the core instruments of religious ritual. Thus, it
would seem unjust for a court to hold an interior regulation constitu-
tional, even under a minimal standard of scrutiny. Both exterior and
interior regulations touch vital areas of religious belief and practice.
The free exercise guarantee of the first amendment should insulate faith
from such infringements, absent a compelling state interest.
2. The Religious Mission
A group's religious "mission" is the central expression of its belief
system, used to carry out the mandates of conscience. The ability to
gather with fellow members of the church or group is the essence of
experiencing one's faith. Generally, landmark restrictions require
churches to spend funds on the maintenance and repair of their historic
properties. Additionally, the church incurs costs resulting from the
requirement to negotiate successfully the time-consuming Commission
procedures. As is clear from the Barwick case, this fiscal burden could
force the church out of its building and out of the community. 154 Even
though the urban economy inevitably causes financial problems for old
congregations, the landmark statutes accentuate these problems by im-
posing additional costs. Ultimately, these ordinances could strip entire
urban areas of spiritual forums for the remaining residents. More im-
portantly, the statutory requirement that churches spend donation
152. Architectural review may raise traditional free speech problems as well. This
argument is forcefully made in Note, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning, and the First
Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REv. 179 (Nov. 1975).
153. See "Angels With Dirty Faces," Preservation News, December, 1986, at 1, for
the Boston example. This article concerns the furtive destruction of the interior of a
church by its own officials in order to avoid landmarking of the interior by the city.
154. Comment, supra note 60, at 1150 ("[A]ssembly of a community of believers [is
essential to] shared spiritual life and common goals"). The author uses this statement
to support his thesis that courts should treat issues on free exercise of religion with the
same care courts afford free speech cases.
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money on architectural preservation, could potentially discourage new
members from joining historic churches.155
Another way to carry out one's religious principles is by spreading
the religious message and living out the dictates of belief in society. To
do either requires money. Preservation statutes limit this method by
imposing financial burdens on religious groups. First, the statutes re-
quire a religious organization to spend a significant portion of its funds
on maintenance and repair of landmarked structures. Second, the ordi-
nance, through its rigid architectural and aesthetic requirements, pre-
vents the affected group, like other owners of landmarked buildings,
from developing the property in any significant manner. The loss of
these two sources of funding for religious activity unconstitutionally
burdens protected first amendment activity.
156
The New York Court of Appeals eliminated development rights as
protected first amendment interests because it found these rights to be
commercial in nature. This approach differs from Supreme Court
cases holding that the combination of first amendment activity with
commercial activity requires the government to show a "sufficiently
important interest in regulating the commercial activity."1 57  Other
cases recognize the frequent intermingling of clearly protected activity
and commercial activity, which otherwise would be subject to full regu-
lation by the state. 58
In Schaumburg v. Citizens For A Better Environment,'59 the Court
concluded that charitable appeals for funds come within the first
155. Note, supra note 111, at 159. The decline of established congregations imposes
additional costs since such congregations are generally the catalysts of new congrega-
tions and strong core of any religious movement.
156. The administrative review process also imposes costs in the way of professional
fees for architects and attorneys.
157. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). Furthermore, the incidental effect
on the protected activity may only be as great as is necessary to further the government
interest. This test is the time, place, and manner standard used in free speech cases.
For purposes of this discussion, the author will label it an intermediate standard of
review.
158. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (the fact that religious
materials are sold instead of given away fails to deprive them of first amendment protec-
tion); Heifron v. Intl. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1980) (solicitations
and sales of materials in the course of propagating one's faith is entitled to protection);
Schaumburg v. Citizens For A Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1979) (solicitation may be
subject to regulation but only in the context of recognizing that it is intertwined with
protected expression).
159. 444 U.S. 620 (1979).
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amendment because "solicitation is characteristically intertwined"
with speech, and "without solicitation the flow of such information and
advocacy would likely cease."' 16' Decades ago, in fact, the Court
warned against subjecting fundraising to full state regulation. The
Court stated that "[a] religious organization needs funds to remain a
going concern" and that religious freedoms should be "available to all,
not merely to those who can pay their own way."' 1 These cases indi-
cate that the distinction between commercial activity and religious ac-
tivity is tenuous. Instead, the analysis should focus on the importance
of the government's interest in regulating the activity.
The financial burden that results from the repair and maintenance
requirements is different in nature than a denial of development rights.
These maintenance provisions constitute an indirect tax on religious
organizations, just as fire and safety codes require the expenditure of
church funds on building maintenance. Even though the latter require-
ments have been held constitutional, a compelling state interest stan-
dard, 1 62 as applied in traditional free exercise cases, is the appropriate
test for judicial review. Any instance where the state requires a reli-
gious organization to spend its funds for public purposes deserves close
scrutiny, both to prevent ingenious attempts to injure the organization
and to insure that the group enjoys the widest latitude possible in the
exercise of its constitutional rights. Preservation statutes are unlikely
to pass this hurdle, although many laws similar to fire and safety codes
may indeed be valid.163 It seems unlikely that the preservation of a
single building or its surroundings would be compelling enough to jus-
tify, as in the Barwick case, the termination of a first amendment
activity.
The financial issue is the core of the preservation battle in Manhat-
tan. One reverend described the essence of the church as "the sum of
160. Id. at 632. It is this "mixture" that led the Court to protect commercial adver-
tising in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1974), even though the advertiser had finan-
cial gain as his motive and advertised goods for sale unrelated to first amendment
interests. Although the members of St. Paul and St. Andrew are constitutionally pro-
tected in soliciting funds from passersby on the street, and in placing secular advertise-
ments in the local newspaper, they lack protection for developing their own property in
an effort to raise funds.
161. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 111.
162. Under this standard, the law must bear "a necessary relationship to a compel-
ling state interest." Sherbert v. Verner, 371 U.S. 398 (1963).
163. Any constitutional test, intermediate or compelling, will justify fire and safety
codes, although compliance requires church expenditure. See City of Sumner v. First
Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 639 P.2d 1358, 1363 (1982).
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all its ministries to the congregation and to the poor and homeless."'"
The reverend warned that should financial demands continue, religious
organizations may lose enthusiasm for their goals. 16 5 Ministry to the
poor and the homeless has become an ever-increasing focus of modem
church activity, especially in Protestant denominations. This ministry
derives its impulse from scriptural imperatives and fundamental reli-
gious beliefs. To the extent that the financial demands of preservation
diminish the ministry, the state has burdened religious belief and prac-
tice.'66 Landmark regulations demand "that religious congregations
direct their. . . energy and their resources to the maintenance of mor-
tar and not to the church's mission and ministry."' 167 The free exercise
of religion is unquestionably "burdened" by the financial requirements
of preservation, and courts should employ a heightened standard of
review to evaluate the constitutionality of preservation ordinances.
3. The Administrative Process
The administrative review process involved in historic preservation
schemes constitutes a separate "burden" on religious belief and prac-
tice. In reaching decisions on architectural appropriateness, the Com-
mission makes sensitive judgments concerning architectural formats
which contain religious belief and symbolism. In deciding whether to
grant hardship relief to a religious organization, the Commission
makes decisions regarding the religious needs and goals of a particular
group. In fact, the Snug Harbor court invited future courts to evaluate
"the purposes and resources" of the affected organization. 68 More-
over, during the evaluation process, the Commission has an opportu-
nity to influence church decisions with minimal review. If the
Commission substitutes its judgment for that of the religious congrega-
tion, however, the Commission assumes an unacceptable role in deci-
sions respecting the conduct of religious ministry.' 69 Observers agree
164. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1985, 11, at 1, col. 3 (Rev. T. Bowers of the Church of St.
Bartholomew).
165. N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1985, II, at 3, col. 4.
166. One state court held that services to the poor are protected elements of the free
exercise of religion. St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Hoboken, 195 N.J.
Super. 414, 479 A.2d 935 (1983).
167. Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1986, at E20, col. 2.
168. Matter of Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376, 378, 288
NY.2d 314, 316 (1968). See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. Moreover,
Commission factfinding is subject only to minimal review.
169. Interfaith Report, supra note 75, at 9.
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that the Commission lacks the standards to resolve conflicts between
architectural quality and the social or religious ambitions of a non-
profit institution."' 0
The potential for abuse during the administrative process is enor-
mous and therefore demands careful consideration before application
of the Commission's procedures to religious groups. Religious leaders
in New York contend that the review process is, in reality, a zoning
mechanism.171 Using building permits as a pretext to stall further
commercial development, the Commission routinely denies such per-
mits prior to designation or public hearings.172 Essentially, preserva-
tion ordinances force churches through a political gauntlet, in which
they must place their ministries and objectives at the mercy of a "not
unbiased group."173
During the administrative review process, Commission members de-
cide intricate questions of theological purpose and religious mission
which even an activist judge would refuse to address. Indeed, one
Commission member criticized the church of St. Bartholomew's appli-
cation as being fraught with questionable practices and numbers.'74
Although such an evaluation may be accurate in individual cases, there
exists great potential for harmful mistakes.
In short, a citizen commission is incapable of constitutionally deter-
mining the religious needs of a wide spectrum of religious groups. Al-
lowing local commissions to arbitrate sensitive questions of theological
purpose and need is blatantly unconstitutional. Since the earliest days
of first amendment analysis, the Supreme Court has refused to allow
interference with or censorship of religious ministries. 7 5 Moreover,
the intense political nature of the Commission's decision-making pro-
170. N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1986, I, at 30, col. 1.
171. Interfaith Report, supra note 75, at 11.
172. Id. at 14-15. The Interfaith Committee revealed that in 1980 the local Com-
munity Board recommended that all churches be required to reveal detailed financial
and operational reports, for planning purposes. Id. at 13.
173. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1986, II, at 3, col. 1.
174. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1986, II, at 4, col. 1 (statement of Anthony Tung). A
Baltimore church refused to grant an easement to the state citing its concern that in the
future there might be a government not so easy to work with and its unwillingness to
cede control of church property to the state. Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1986, at E21, col. 2.
175. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) (state secretary may not
make decisions regarding whether a group is religious which involve "the appraisal of
facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion.").
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cess adds tremendous strain to intracongregational relations. 176 While
church harmony on such matters is rare, the administrative process
encourages some church factions to join forces with Commission mem-
bers and public officials in a bitter, public battle over the church's
ministry. 177
B. A Constitutional Test for Preservation Laws
Given the demonstrated impact on first amendment interests, the
Barwick court's indifference to the church's claims and its affirmation
of the Spatt rationale is clearly erroneous. Like the reasonableness
tests used by state courts in zoning cases, 178 this approach assumes the
absence of first amendment interests. Even if courts limited the Bar-
wick holding to those activities which are secular, 17 9 first amendment
concerns would persist. Judicial determinations regarding what activ-
ity is "religious" are merely conclusory statements of the court's defini-
tion of religion.18° These determinations demand an inquiry into
religious purpose inconsistent with first amendment analysis. Since the
Supreme Court treats first amendment activity and commercial activity
the same, it is preferable for a court to apply some form of free exercise
analysis to all religiously motivated activity. In other words, the court
should accept a good faith claim of religious infringement or interfer-
ence and allow the case to turn on the nature of the government's inter-
est in enforcing its policy.' 8 '
In formulating a more appropriate test, courts should recognize that
176. It became commonplace during the Commission's review of St. Bartholomew
for church members to yell at each other and hurl insults during the public hearings.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1985, II, at 1, col. 2.
177. Preservation News, supra note 153. Boston's Church of the Immaculate Con-
ception, a 125 year-old landmark, was "vandalized" by its own officials in October,
1986, to prevent city landmarking of the church interior. Like the Church of St. Paul
and St. Andrew, this church was planning a renovation of the worship facility for con-
tinuing religious use. The preservation movement seems to have adopted a bitter tone
toward church claims of interference. Id. at 14.
178. See supra notes 49-59.
179. The Barwick court apparently eliminated this distinction as found in Spatt
since a major portion of the church's plan was simply to revamp its own worship build-
ing. Alternatively, of course, renovating even worship facilities could be considered
secular.
180. For discussion of this approach, see Historic Preservation Ordinances, supra
note 143, at 409; Comment, supra note 60, at 1162.
181. This principle is best explained in the zoning area in Comment, supra note 60,
at 1132.
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the government's interest in historic preservation varies from case to
case. The governmental interest is greatest where a highly significant
church anchors an important historic district, and thus demolition or
alteration would hamper an entire statutory scheme.18 2 Where a
church is an isolated landmark, however, the governmental interest is
less compelling and the congregation's first amendment rights should
prevail. One commentator suggested applying a reasonableness test in
land use cases, which considers the varying degrees of interest on both
sides. ' 3 A similar test is the two-sided balancing test used by the Col-
orado court in Lakewood.'84 Applying such tests to preservation laws,
however, is questionable. Both tests suffer from a propensity to weigh
the interests of the religious organization. Although such interests will
vary from case to case, courts should refrain from putting a value on
them as a matter of judicial prudence, but should instead defer to the
first amendment.18 5
A more promising test for preservation cases is the standard applied
to time, place, and manner restrictions on free speech: each regulation
must serve an important government purpose and must be accom-
plished by the least restrictive means possible."8 6 Since it evaluates
only the importance of the government interest, this test has the dis-
tinct advantage of being one-sided. The limitation of this approach is
its inherent assumption that the religious interests are less important
than those interests in the more traditional "belief" cases. In the free
speech area, as in zoning cases concerning merely location, courts can
clearly identify the right; the remaining question is where and how the
right will be practiced. In locational zoning cases, the New York
courts have adopted the intermediate standard of review to answer this
question.'8 7 Preservation ordinances interfere with the extent and na-
182. See Historic Preservation Ordinances, supra note 143, at 418.
183. Note, Zoning the Church: Toward a Concept of Reasonableness, 12 CONN. L.
REv. 571, 606 (Spring 1980). The author states that a city should deny a church con-
struction permit only if construction would greatly impair the neighboring areas and the
zoning ordinance provided an alternate location for the church to build. Moreover, the
author suggests that the city should support its permit denials with evidence of potential
ill effects on the community surrounding the desired site of construction.
184. See supra note 31.
185. Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (S.D. 1982), and Badoni v. Higginson, 638
F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), are examples of where courts have become embroiled in such
determinations of theological importance. See also Comment, supra note 60, at 1160.
186. See generally Comment, supra note 60.
187. See supra notes 18-37.
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ture of religious practice and belief, especially in the context of admin-
istrative review.
In the future, courts ruling on the validity of preservation ordinances
should adopt the compelling state interest test employed in traditional
free exercise cases. 188 Adoption of this test is problematic, since its
application has become tantamount to striking down the statute at is-
sue. In land use regulation, however, the compelling state interest test
does not have this effect. For instance, the Indian cases would be con-
sistent if those courts had imposed a compelling interest standard.' 89
While courts may find municipal regulations, such as minimal fire and
safety regulations, compelling, they may rule differently on setback reg-
ulations. Perhaps the result will vary in preservation cases as well, de-
pending on the structure involved. Normally, however, it is a safe
assumption that preservation restrictions will rarely pass the compel-
ling state interest test. The Interfaith summary of the preservation
conflict is close to the truth in stating that "designation of religious
property as a landmark is an impermissible usurpation by government
of religious assets for an inferior secular purpose."190 Notwithstanding
preservationists' great desire to protect our heritage, they must not
achieve their goal at the expense of destroying the very rights which
gave birth to the religious structures.1 91
188. The statute must have a "necessary relationship to a compelling state interest."
189. United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247 (D.S.D. 1985), held that grazing
interests on federal lands and public recreational facilities were not compelling interests.
Badoni, 638 F.2d 172, on the other hand, correctly noted that reservoir building was
such an interest.
190. Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1986, E21 at col. 2.
191. Exempting religious groups from application of landmark ordinances will be
challenged on Establishment Clause grounds. Such an accommodationist policy should
be upheld; otherwise, there is no way to protect religious freedom without violating the
Establishment Clause. The court in Means addressed this issue and held in favor of
accommodation. Another favorable view is found in Note, Land Use Regulation and
the Free Exercise Clause, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1562, 1580 (1984) (suggests that courts
should focus on the possibility of achieving a compromise between religious needs and
governmental interests in order to afford greater first amendment protection to religious
organizations). In the preservation context, see the American Indian Religious Free-
dom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982), for a statutory exemption. But cf Badoni,
638 F2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980) for a view contrary to accommodation in the federal land
use context.
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol33/iss1/4
COMMENTARY
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol33/iss1/4
